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RECENT CASE NOTES
that the testator had given directions to the scrivener to the effect that the
daughter should receive $5,000 in cash "to be paid out of the money derived from the Burbank estate" and that in consequence the item was drawn
up. This finding of fact apparently was not questioned. The direction
to the scrivener unquestionably tends to show an intent on the part of
the testator to make the gift specific, but it was not referred to in the
Appellate Court's decision holding the gift demonstrative. There is authority in point with the Supreme Court on very similar facts but that
is of very little value when the intent of the testator is in question. In
re Tillinghast, (R. I.) 49 Atl. 634; Gelbrach v. Shively, (Md.) 10 Atl.
The Appellate Court, in its decision on the face of the will alone, and
without considering the direction of the testator, seems to have reached
a decision in line with modern trend of cases; whereas, the Supreme Court,
in the light of this finding of fact, was justified in affirming the judgment
of the lower court on the ground that the actual intent of the testator was
R. R. D.
revealed.
WILLS-DEvISE OvER ON DECEASE OF FIRST TAKER-CONSTRUCTION-

The will of testatrx provided: "I give, devise and bequeath as follows,
that is to say, I give to my beloved 'Step' daughter Lillie B. Ratcliff of
Owen county, for love and affection, also considering her care and attention to me in my declining years, also to give George Taylor (colored) for
services rendered as a faithful servant for more than forty years:
"To each of them I give $1,000 out of any money of which I may die
possessed. Also in connection with the foregoing I give to said Lillie Belle
Ratcliff and George Taylor (colored) the following described real estate
provided, however, none of the before described land shall be sold during
the natural life of said George Taylor, but that the said Lillie Bell Ratcliff shall provide for the said George Taylor a home during his natural
life and at his death it shall be the property of the aforesaid Lillie B.
Ratcliffe and her heirs forever.
"I direct that the following described lands . . . be sold and that
the proceeds . . . be divided into three equal shares and that one share

be given to my beloved 'Step' daughter Lillie Belle Ratcliff, and that one
share be given to my son-in-law James E. Champer of Greencastle, Indiana, and one share to George Taylor. Now if the said Lillie Belle Ratcliffe shall decease then her heirs shall receive her share, provided they
shall carry into effect the provisions of this will.
"If the said James E. Champer and his wife shall decease, then the
said Lillie Belle Rateliff shall receive his share, or her heirs if she be not
living.
"The purpose of this gift to the said George Taylor (colored) is that
he may be provided with a comfortable home and living during his natural
life but after his death . . . then . . . it shall become the property
of the aforesaid Lillie B. Ratcliff to be hers and her heirs for ever after."
James E. Champer, and his wife (who was his sole heir) died after
testatrix, and the appellant Lillie B. Ratcliff claimed a remainder in the
% share which had been given the Champers, on the ground that (1) considering the rest of will, testatrix intended a life estate only in James E.
Champers, and (2) that the words "if the said James E. Champer and
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his wife shall decease" refer to their death at any time, either before or
after the death of testatrix. Demurrer was sustained.
Held, affirmed. Ratcliffe v. Kreigh, 170 N. E. 354, - App. -.
The Appellate Court relied upon two rules of construction: First, that
if it is possible to do so, a will will be construed so as to vest the entire
estate at the time of testator's death. Second, that a devise over upon
the first taker's death will be construed to mean such death within the
lifetime of testator.
The first rule of construction is elementary. The second one has been
relied upon by the Indiana courts many times, and it may be said that the
Appellate Court had ample authority for its position on this point. Fowler
v. Duhme, 143 Ind. 248; Alfred v. Sylvester, 184 Ind. 542.
However, the Appellate Court has in the past taken the position that
the rule is merely one of construction, and that slight evidence from the
language of the will is sufficient to defeat the rule. Vaubel v. Lang, 81
App. 432. The better opinion seems to be that the rule of construction
will yield in all cases to a different intention fairly taken from the entire
will. Tiffany, Real Property, 2d Ed. Vol. 1, Sec. 166.
It seems to us that in the present case, the general testamentary
scheme, as gathered from the whole will, was to give a life estate only to
the son-in-law Champer; that the court should not have applied the above
rule of construction in this case. The testatrix made three principal dispositions. The first was a $1,000 bequest to appellant and to the negro
servant. The second was of the house, which was given to the appellant
and the servant, but with the careful provision that upon the death of the
servant the property was to go to appellant "and her heirs forever." The
third disposition (which is in dispute) creates three shares, one to appellant, one to Champer, and one to the servant. Testatrix then provided
that if appellant should die, her heirs should receive her share; if Champer
and his wife should die, then appellant to take his share "or her heirs if
she be not living." Then the testatrix proceeds to qualify the gift of the
share to the servant by providing for a remainder after his death to
appellant "and her heirs forever." In no instance except where applying
to the appellant, does the testatrix use the words "heirs" or similar language. It would seem, from the relationship of the parties, from the evident desire of testatrix to reward the appellant for "her care and consideration to me in my declining years," and from the fact that each gift
to another person ends up with a remainder to the appellant, that testatrix
intended that all the property should eventually come into the possession
of the appellant. The condition of the gift over is "if . . . Champer
and his wife shall decease." It could hardly be said that the testatrix contemplated the death of both Champer and his wife before her own.
The Supreme Court of Indiana has in the past apparently taken the
position that the rule is to be applied without inquiring into the actual
intention of the testator. (Vol. III, Indiana Law Journal, p. 630.) Perhaps the Appellate Court is now more in accord with that position.
C. W. W.
WmLs--Ruix IN SHELLY'S CAsE-A will provided for a farm to be
divided equally among the testator's three children. "Each third of said

